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Abstract: is paper introduces ABODE, an agent-based model for Origin-Destination (OD) demand estimation, that can serve as a work
trip distribution model. e model takes residential locations of workers and the locations of employers as exogenous and deals speciﬁcally
with the interactions between ﬁrms and workers in creating a job-worker match and the commute outcomes. It is meant to illustrate that by
explicitly modeling the search and hiring process, origins and destinations (ODs) can be linked at a disaggregate level that is reasonably true
to the actual process. e model is tested on a toy-city as well as using data from the Twin Cities area. e toy-city model illustrates that the
model predicts reasonable commute outcomes, with agents selecting the closest work place when wage and skill diﬀerentiation is absent in the
labor market. e introduction of wage dispersion and skill diﬀerentiation increases the average home to work distances considerably. Using
data from Twin Cities area of Minneapolis-St. Paul, we also show that the model captures aggregate commute outcomes well. Overall, the
results suggest that the behavior rules as implemented lead to reasonable patterns. Future improvements and directions are also discussed.
1 Introduction
e relationship between home and work has been an impor-
tant research area for economists, urban geographers, sociol-
ogists and others. Traditionally, the approach taken by trans-
portation professionals tomatch home andwork locations has
been to use trip distribution models. ese models are part
of the widely used four-step transportation planning process
comprising steps of trip generation, trip distribution, mode
choice and route assignment. Trip distribution models such
as the gravity model, which use aggregate zonal variables to
match home and work, are still widely used by many planning
organizations. Together with the trip generation step, these
models predict zonal interchange of trips at an aggregate level.
While this framework is very useful, it overlooksmuchofwhat
happens as the connection between people’s home and work
are established.
As output needs of transportation models have evolved,
changes in the traditional modeling framework have become
necessary. Today’s planning questions involve a range of issues
from air quality to congestionmitigation, evaluation of diﬀer-
ent demand management strategies, and providing a testing
environment for diﬀerent policy prescriptions. e response
has been the development of diﬀerent activity-based models
that are grounded in travel behavior. ese models continue
to try to bring some realism in the choice of destinations, trip
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chaining behavior, scheduling within the constraints placed
by households, other actors, and space and time. is change
has also meant a shi in the unit of analysis from traﬃc zones
to households and individuals, making it necessary that home
andwork locations also be known at amore disaggregate level.
In this paper we propose and test an agent-based model of
worker and jobmatching. e connection between home and
work is the outcome of interactions between employers and
job seekers that have diﬀerent goals. e employer is oen
motivated by increased productivity through the addition of
new staﬀ to perform particular duties (Holzer 1987), while
the employee has aims of increased income and other long-
term goals that have to do with their future ambitions. Each
searches for their best ﬁtting counterpart and hope the match
they ﬁnd takes them forward in the fulﬁllment of their re-
spective goals. In addition to geographic locations of jobs and
workers, thismatching process is structured by how employers
advertise and recruit, how workers search and weigh alterna-
tives, and the limited amount of information that is available
to each searcher about opportunities.
emodelwepropose takes residential locations ofworkers
and the locations of employers as exogenous and deals specif-
ically with the interactions between ﬁrms and workers in cre-
ating a job-worker match, and the commute outcomes. It is
meant to illustrate that by explicitly modeling the search pro-
cess and the interactions between ﬁrms and individuals, ori-
gins and destinations (ODs) can be linked at a disaggregate
level that is reasonably true to the actual process. In doing so,
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the model seeks to develop home-work connections that can
be used as part of either the traditional four-step model, re-
placing home based work trip distributionmodels, or as an in-
put into activity basedmodels, that generally take these longer
term decisions as external inputs.
In the next section, we will discuss some of the background
in matching residences to employment. Section 3 discusses
the agent based model. at is followed by a test of the model
using a hypothetical toy city in section 4 and a test of the
model’s behavior using diﬀerent inputs in section 5. In Sec-
tion 6, the model is applied to a subset of individual and job
data extracted from the 2000Travel Behavior Inventory (TBI)
data for theTwinCities area and the results are discussed. Sec-
tion 7 provides a summary.
2 Background
e relationship between home and work has been an impor-
tant research area for economists, urban geographers, sociolo-
gists and others who have each brought their ﬁeld’s experience
to the understanding of how workers and jobs are matched.
Labor economist have used search theory (Stigler 1961,
1962) to explain the behavior of searchers in the labor mar-
ket. e approach conceives of searchers that are faced with
randomly arriving oﬀers, which they can choose to accept or
reject. Optimal stopping and searching decisions are oen in-
vestigated anddepend onwhat the searcher knows aboutwage
distributions, oﬀer arrival rates, and themarginal costs and ex-
pected gains of waiting for the next oﬀer. Works by Rouwen-
dal (1998, 1999), van Ommeren (1998); van Ommeren and
Rietveld (2002); van Ommeren et al. (1999); van Ommeren
and vander Straaten (2008) have used a search based approach
to study the relationship between jobs, residence and com-
mute where individuals maximize lifetime utility based on
wages, place utility and commuting costs.
Urban economists on the other hand have proposed mod-
els that take work place locations as exogenous, and theo-
rized about the choice of residential locations. Models of this
type include those of Alonso (1964), Muth (1969) and Mills
(1972). In the mono-centric city model, residential locations
are assumed to be selected such that higher travel costs are
compensated by cheaper land prices. Later works, for exam-
ple by Hamilton (1982) and White (1988), have shown ac-
tual commutes to be higher than predicted by these models,
though to diﬀerent degrees.
van Ommeren et al. (1999) also show that models that as-
sume transportation costs are fully compensated for by wages
overestimate the wages required to compensate workers with
longer commutes because they ignore residential relocation
decisions. Similarly, they show that residential (place) utility
need not fully compensate workers commute costs because of
the possibility of future job changes.
While the possibility of future moves can account for some
of the observed longer commutes, other possible reasons are
also cited in the literature including within household eﬀects
of multi-worker households, increasing importance of non-
work trips and other housing and neighborhood attributes
(Giuliano and Small 1993). In addition, information imper-
fection in the job and residential search process, costs of relo-
cation, as well as the very low rate at which employment oﬀers
reach job searchers have also been cited as possible explana-
tions (van Ommeren and van der Straaten 2008).
ere are several key elements in the matching process that
are instrumental in increasing the chances for some to get em-
ployed while reducing the chances for others to get access to
the same job even when they share similar skill sets. Let us
consider a relatively simple system where employers advertise
positions, searchers apply to these positions, employers then
make an oﬀer to the best candidate, and the employee decides
to accept or reject the oﬀer. For a match to be successful, the
job seeker must have access to information that the position is
open to begin with. Second the searcher must have skills that
reasonably match the position. e searcher must also be able
to meet the screening criteria of the employer. And ﬁnally for
those that receive oﬀers, the oﬀer has to be better than what
the searcher sees as their best alternative. Each of these steps
creates both barriers and opportunities to diﬀerent types of
people from getting any given job that is available.
e path the employer follows in recruiting can eﬀectively
block out a segment of the population or create systematic bias
as to who receives that information. For example, recruitment
procedures that use employee referrals would focus on people
who are in someway connected to existing employees (Holzer
1987); advertising in a subset of local labor markets can ex-
clude others that may have similar skills but reside outside of
the focus area (Neckerman andKirschenman1991). Once ap-
plications from job seekers are received, ﬁrm screening proce-
dures also impact who gets particular opportunities. In ad-
dition to skills, education and experience, employers can use
other ways tomake judgements about the quality of the appli-
cant’s match. A referral is one way this is achieved, and other
methods can include the use of demographic proxies to get at
the same information. e latter is the focus of many studies
that look at discriminatory behavior of employers in regards
to a variety of factors ranging from race and gender to weight
and smoking.
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On the worker’s side, whatmethod of search one would use
can lead tomissed opportunities. In addition, their judgement
as to whether the opportunities they know about are worth
pursuing given their skill set and goals will impact the oﬀers
they eventually receive. Most search models reasonably as-
sume searchers do not have complete information about all
available jobs. While cost, aswell as human capacity are part of
the reasons for these, in some cases information barriers can be
erected due to strategies adopted by ﬁrms. When considering
commute outcomes, it becomes important to know of these
systematic reasons especially when geographic targeting alters
the possible application and oﬀer rates that residents in some
areas receive. Neckerman andKirschenman (1991), for exam-
ple, ﬁnd that employment of inner-city blacks is hampered by
recruitment practices which, when targeting neighborhoods,
avoid inner cities. e economic beneﬁts of hiring through re-
ferrals for ﬁrms is illustrated by Fernandez et al. (2000). Such
a strategy would signiﬁcantly lower the chances of individuals
not connected to current employees to learn about opportu-
nities. Other studies have also shown that ﬁnding a job is very
much tied to whom one knows (Granovetter 1974). Finally,
thosewho receive oﬀers have toweigh among themby looking
at wages, future prospects and other alternatives.
Given that both employer policies on advertising, screen-
ing, hiring, as well as worker strategies in searching are instru-
mental in forming the job-worker match, themodel proposed
below looks at both sides using an agent-based framework.
e structure that is created by the interaction of searchers and
ﬁrms suggests that even if minimizing commute time were a
goal for searchers, it would have to be done within the con-
text of what opportunities are known by the searcher. In brief,
themodel operates by having employers solicit applications to
ﬁll their open positions and unemployed workers (or others
looking for new positions) searching and competing for em-
ployment. Having received interested applicants, ﬁrms under-
take a screening step to ﬁlter out those that do not meet their
hiring criteria, and select the best matching candidate from
the remaining applicant pool. Workers, both employed and
unemployed, search for opportunities, submit applications to
those that they consider worth pursuing, and accept or reject
oﬀers based on what alternatives they have and their current
state. Both workers and jobs are assumed to have skills and
skill requirements respectively that are important inmatching
one another. Other social factors, such as the presence of con-
tacts for example, are also assumed to have a role in promot-
ing certain job-worker matches to occur. e model also pro-
vides a ﬂexible platform that can be expanded to include dif-
ferent decision frameworks and policy variables. Subsequent
sections will discuss the model and its performance using dif-
ferent data.
3 The Model
e model proposed here matches origins and destinations
using employment search at the individual level. e out-
comes depend on skills of the searcher, compensation, com-
mute preferences, the locations of employment opportunities,
and the willingness of ﬁrms to employ the searcher. e geo-
graphic plain on which the modeling is undertaken contains
both employment locations which may be ﬂexibly arranged
into one or multiple employment zones or be randomly dis-
tributed, as well as residential locations which can also be dis-
tributed as desired. Firm andhousing locations are assumed to
be exogenous in the model. Workers will search for employ-
ment from ﬁxed home locations.
e model contains both active agents which interact with
one another through out the simulation and inactive agents
which are mainly used to mark location and to house employ-
ment opportunities.e inactive agents in this model are job
centers, where ﬁrms are located, and the ﬁrms where employ-
ment positions are housed. Job centers and ﬁrms are present
to give structure to the location of employment opportunities.
Job centers (whichmay be one ormany) house ﬁrms, andﬁrms
house employment opportunities. e presence of job cen-
ters is optional. When job centers are not present ﬁrms can
be distributed through out the modeled area randomly. All
employment opportunities are housed within a ﬁrm to which
they are randomly assigned. eactive agents in thismodel are
the workers and employment positions which interact with
one another in determining job opportunities and pay scales,
and negotiate agreeable arrangements for employment. Each
of these agents are discussed below.
3.1 Job Centers
e purpose of job centers is to house ﬁrms. ese are estab-
lished as optional ﬁelds where a mono-centric, poly-centric,
or a city with distributed employment can be modeled in the
the home-job matching process. e location of the job cen-
ters can be at any location on the plain that is being modeled,
though when mono-centric models are considered the loca-
tion has been ﬁxed at the center of the geographic area.
3.2 Firms
Firms house employment locations. When job centers are
present, ﬁrms can locate in only one of the job centers. As-
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signment of ﬁrms to job centers is done randomly at the start
of the simulation. In the current model, once a ﬁrm chooses a
location, it does not relocate. Employment locations are also
assigned to the ﬁrm randomly. Once employment positions
are assigned to them, ﬁrms know how big they are what types
of positions they have. ough the number of employees at a
particular ﬁrm may change, the number of positions that are
available at each of the ﬁrms does not change throughout the
simulation.
3.3 Employment Positions andWorkers
Employment positions are housed in Firms. Each employ-
ment position has characteristics that it requires fulﬁlled by
potential employees (or a minimum skill set that is needed to
be fulﬁlled). e skill set required by any position (Jq ) is as-
signed as a randomly generated integer ranging from one to
ﬁve. Each of these is assumed to be increasing in specialization
and commands an average pay that is higher than the preced-
ing level. Each position is assumed to have an amount that it is
willing to pay an employee. At the start of the simulation, the
pay that positions are willing to oﬀer is assigned to the jobs by
pulling from a uniform distribution whose mean is a function
of the position’s skill level as shown in equation 1 and whose
range is $10,000. Alternatively, wage dispersion can be set to
0, leaving the wage to be only a function of the desired skill.
Wo = Jq10000+Wd i s pQp
¦
Qp Uni f (0,10000)
(1)
where
Jq : the job-class for the position.
Wo : is the amount that the position oﬀers to pay
prospective employees.
Qp : is a random draw from a uniform distribution with
a range of $10,000.
Wd i s p : indicates whether there is wage dispersion at a
given skill level
At any given time, a positions can be open or taken (closed).
When a position is open, it automatically advertises itself, and
job seekers who encounter it can apply to occupy the posi-
tion. When a position is already occupied by a worker, it is
not searchable and does not take any applications. Employ-
ment positions know howwell applicants as well as the person
occupying them matches the requirements of the job. Each
employment position acts as would a human resources depart-
ment in real life, by accepting and screening applications as
well as making oﬀers, and negotiating a salary with qualiﬁed
applicants. When they have diﬃculty attracting talent, posi-
tions increase their oﬀer pay at each iteration.
Workers start out randomly assigned to residential loca-
tions from which they search for jobs. Workers residences are
assumed to be stationary. Each worker is randomly assigned
a skill class (Sc ) that corresponds to the job-classes (Jq ) for
the employment positions. At the start of the simulation all
workers are seeking employment. ey search for open posi-
tions that ﬁt their skills and put in applications reporting their
qualiﬁcations. Each worker is also assumed to have a mini-
mum wage (Wm) that they would want to accept any job of-
fer. is is set at Wm = Sc  5000 +Wd i s p  Qa , where
Qa  Uni f (0,5000). At the beginning of the simulation,
each worker also has an expected wage (W ue ) which is set 10
percent higher thanWm . Once the searcher is employed, their
expected wage (W ee ) will be set greater then or equal to their
earnings at the time of search.
Workers are assumed to have limited information on avail-
able positions that match their skills. To ﬁnd information,
workers have to start searching for opportunities with some
intensity I . Diﬀerent workers can have diﬀerent search inten-
sities that describes how many applications they put in at any
given time slice. A worker only receives oﬀers from those po-
sitions to which it has applied.
ough skill matching is an important part of the model,
workers are allowed to apply to positions for which they are
slightly under or over qualiﬁed. ey however are assumed to
avoid applying to untenable positions by comparing their skill
class (Sc ) with the job class (Jq ) of the employment position.
Some searchers can use a contact to gain access to employ-
ment. A proportion of these contacts are assumed to be in-
ﬂuential and can leverage their position to increase the match
between the applicant and the open position even though the
match of skills to criteria may not be perfect (or even when
other better matches might be available).
e model allows for individuals to receive any number of
oﬀers at a given time given they have applied to the position,
and they are selected as the best applicant for that position.
When several job oﬀers are made to the respondent within a
given iteration, the model assumes they arrive such that they
can be compared against one another simultaneously. Once
an oﬀer ismade to aworker, searchers choosewhich oﬀer is the
best and decide to accept or reject the oﬀer by comparing its
oﬀer wage and transportation costs to their current situation.
e selection process may be speciﬁed so that a deterministic
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decision framework is adopted where the highest oﬀer is cho-
sen, or a probabilistic decision is made based on travel time
and salary considerations within the Expected Utility frame-
work. Decisions are also assumed to bemade only on the basis
of oﬀers and current wages or reservation wages. Workers do
not know what the likelihood of oﬀers in the next time slice
will be. Oﬀers that improve the net present value of their net
income (wages minus commuting costs discounted over ex-
pected tenure) are always accepted. Further all workers’ res-
idential locations are assumed to be ﬁxed.
When searching, those that are already employed adjust
their asking pay so that it is higher than their current salary.
ose that are unemployed will lower their asking wage un-
til it reaches their reservation wage for each iteration that
they remain unemployed. To stay competitive employment
positions also oﬀer annual increases for their employees. In
part these raises ensure that employers retain employees for
longer durations than theywouldotherwise. e raise amount
is randomly generated from a uniform distribution and im-
plies a variability in the wages oﬀered for similar positions.
Researchers have empirically shown that similar workers re-
ceive markedly diﬀerent wages for similar types of jobs (e.g.,
Krueger and Summers (1988); Murphy and Topel (1987))
whose existence has been theorized to arise from diﬀerent rea-
sons including employer wage policies, as well as unmeasured
worker abilities (Christensen et al. 2005).
3.4 Job Search andMatching
ejob search andmatchingprocess consists of a series of steps
where worker agents seek employment, weigh oﬀers, and de-
cide on positions, while employers advertise, evaluate appli-
cants and make hiring decisions. e overall ﬂow of the de-
cision process and interaction between these agents is shown
in Figure 1. At the start of the simulation all workers do not
have jobs and all positions are open. Workers start out decid-
ing with what intensity I they will search for a job. e search
intensity determines the number of applications a worker sub-
mits at a given iteration of the simulation. A global vari-
able sets the minimum andmaximum search eﬀorts, and each
agent selects their intensity within these limits. Since there is
some cost to the application process, we assume that workers
apply to positions that are reasonable ﬁts for their skills. Once
a searcher has selected the intensity I withwhich to search, ap-
plications are submitted to I open positions that satisfy equa-
tion 2. In cases where I exceeds the number of positions avail-
able that meet the application criteria, the worker applies to
all available qualifying positions.Jq   Sc  t o l (2)
where:
Jq : Job class for a position being considered
Sc : Skill class for the searching individual
t o l : A global tolerance level among searchers for under
or over-qualiﬁcation
When the tolerance level in equation 2 is set to 0, work-
ers only apply to jobs that are a perfect match to their skills.
Greater numbers imply over or under-qualiﬁed applicants can
also apply and compete for a position. ere are at least two
factors that can make slightly under-qualiﬁed applicants ap-
pealing to the employer. First is that their asking salary may
be lower as compared to those with more skills. Second, job
searchers may use contacts to ﬁnd employment, a proportion
of whom may be able to inﬂuence the outcome of the hiring
process. Two global variables in the model Pc and Pc l con-
trol the proportion of people who ﬁnd jobs through contacts
and the proportion of those whose contacts can leverage their
relationship with the employer to assist in better matching re-
spectively. Currently whether a contact is used and whether
the contact is inﬂuential is set randomly according to proba-
bilities equal to Pc and Pc l at each iteration, and no informa-
tion as to the identity of the contact is generated.
3.5 Evaluating Applicants and Making Oﬀers
Open positions which have received applications evaluate
each applicant using two steps. In the ﬁrst step employers re-
move unqualiﬁed applicants from the pool and retain only
those applicants that satisfy equation 3. Positions then ran-
domly sample one of the qualiﬁed applicants and extend an
oﬀer.
Sc +Cl  Jq (3)
where
Sc : Skill class for the applicant j
Cl : Whether applicant j used an inﬂuential contact (1
if true, 0 otherwise)
Jq : Job class for the position being considered
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Figure 1: Flowchart of the model. e sequence of decisions for each agent is shown. Interactions between workers and jobs (e.g.,
putting in applications, receiving oﬀers) are not linked by arrows for clarity.
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3.6 Weighing Oﬀers and Searcher Decisions
Workers that the employer selects as best meeting their cri-
teria receive oﬀers of employment. A searcher may receive
more than one oﬀer depending on where they applied and
whom they competed against. e decision on the part of the
searcher to accept any given oﬀer proceeds in two steps. First,
the applicant selects which oﬀer they regard as the best among
the competing oﬀers. Second this best oﬀer is weighed against
the current state that the searcher is in. A decision is made
whether to accept the oﬀer or remain in the current position
by comparing the net present value of their income stream less
transportation costs over their expected tenure. e selection
of the best oﬀer among competing oﬀers is done by weighing
the travel distance and the oﬀer wage in an expected utility
framework. e probability that a person considers oﬀer k
the best among the competing oﬀers made to them is calcu-
lated according to equation 4.
p bi j =
e1iTd j+2Wo jPno f f e r s
k=1
e1iTdk+2Wok
(4)
where
p bi j : e probability that worker i selects oﬀer j as the
best among competing oﬀers
Td j : e daily travel cost (round trip travel time to the
oﬀered job) of oﬀer j (in hours)
Wo j : e oﬀer pay that position j is willing to pay
($/day)
1i : e coeﬃcient for travel cost for person i .
2: e coeﬃcient for wages (set at 1).
e parameters for the utility function are selected so that
individual level diﬀerences are allowed in the travel cost vari-
able. emarginal rate of substitution between travel cost and
wages is selected so that it represents the agent’s expectedwage
when searching. With 2 ﬁxed at 1 for all individuals, this
would mean that -1i =We i for person i. e selection of
2 to be equal to 1 is arbitrary. Any other selectionwould not
alter the order of preferences for any given set of alternatives
though the probabilities may change.
Once a searcher determines the best oﬀer, this oﬀer is then
compared to their current position using the net present value
of staying where the agent is currently and the new oﬀer over
the expected tenure of the new position. enet present value
calculation takes into consideration income and transporta-
tion costs only, and at a yearly discount rate  , it is calculated
as shown in equation 5.
NPVte =
teX
t=0
Wk  VOT Tdk Nw
(1+  )t
(5)
where
NPVk te : the net present value as a result of being at job
k for an expected tenure of te
Wk : annual wage at job k
VOTk : value of commute time for person j at job k (as-
sumedWk)
Tdk : e daily travel cost (round trip travel time to the
oﬀered job) of oﬀer j (in hours)
Nw : Number of working days in a year
 : the annual discount rate
te : the expected tenure at the new position
is value is calculated both for the current job that the
individual holds and the new best oﬀer that the individual
receives. If the NPV of the best oﬀer is higher than that
for the current job, then the worker chooses to accept the
new position; otherwise, they will stay and continue search-
ing. Searching and job relocation costs are assumed negligible
in theNPV calculation. Workers will accept the oﬀered job
as is if it is above their expected pay. When the oﬀered salary is
less than what is expected by the searcher, a negotiated salary
is assumed that is randomly determined to be between the of-
fered salary and the expected salary. is new salary serves as
the basis of future search when the worker decides to search
again.
3.7 Changing Employment
Each year aer a worker has found employment, they re-
evaluate whether or not they should search for an alternative
position. While several reasons may motivate searching for
another position while already employed (on-the-job search),
here we assume the probability to search for another job is
a function of tenure. Farber (1999) makes two observations
that are important here about the U.S. labor market. First is
that long-term employment relationships are common, and
that beyond a certain point, workers will choose to stay with
their current employer; and second, that most new jobs end
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early. e overall eﬀect is that with increasing tenure, the
probability of job change declines (Farber 1999). Here, the
probability for on-the-job searching ismodeled so that it is de-
creasing with tenure. Each year the probability that a person
would want to change employment is given by equation 9. If
a search at any given time was not successful, the workers will
have to decide whether or not to search in the next cycle.
pr e l = 1 
e (tr  t¯r )
1+ e (tr  t¯r )
(6)
where
pr e l : is the probability of wanting to change jobs
tr : tenure at current employment
t¯r : the tenure for the population beyond which the
probability to start searching for another job declines be-
low 0.5 (a global variable in the model).
3.8 Competition
In trying to match one another, both employers and workers
canmake themselves attractive to each another. Each year that
a position remains open, it can increase its oﬀer price to attract
applicants. Similarly workers that are unemployed can make
themselves attractive by reducing their asking price each itera-
tion they remain unemployed until they reach theirminimum
pay. ose that are currently employed and searching can in-
crease their expectedwage by adding a fewpercentages to their
existing salary. Similarly employers can also increase thewages
paid to their current employees each year to counteract any in-
centives that rising oﬀers at open positions may have. ese
adjustments are assumed to be random draws from a distribu-
tion whose maximum is speciﬁed at the beginning of the sim-
ulation. e magnitude of these changes are assumed to de-
crease as the lengthof searchor tenure increases. In reality, em-
ployed individuals retire and limits exist for how much a ﬁrm
is willing to pay for a particular position. By implementing
these caps, a position at any given skill level increases the wage
oﬀered only to a point when it remains unﬁlled. Expected
wages also decline to a minimum beyond which the person is
unwilling to work. Alternatively, by setting these percentages
at zero, the search can be conditioned on ﬁxed wages. ese
cases are compared in the following section using a simpliﬁed
urban landscape.
Wo,t =Wo,t 1  (1+  f (uo)o ) (7)
W ue ,t = max(W
u
a,t 1  (1   f (us )c ),Wmin) (8)
W ee ,t =Wt 1  (1+  f (tr )r ) (9)
where:
Wo,t : Wage oﬀer at time t
W ue ,t : e expected wage at time t, when the person is
unemployed
W ee ,t : e expected wage at time t, when the person is
employed
Wt : e wage received at time t by the searcher
o : e rise in oﬀer wages by employers when a position
remains open o U (0,o,max )
c :e decline in expected wages when unemployed,
c U (0,c ,max )
r : e rise in wages each year a person remains em-
ployed, r U (0,r,max )
uo : the number of iterations the oﬀering positions has
stayed open
us : the number of iterations the unemployed worker has
been searching
tr : tenure at the current position
f (.): function, here equal to f (x) = x10 .
3.9 Stopping rules
Currently themodel stops when employment conditions have
not changed for any agent for 50 iterations (the equivalent of
4.2 years in the tenure calculations) or if the total number of
iterations has reached 500. Under the simplest conditions, the
model stops well ahead of the 500 count.
4 Testing with simpliﬁed models
e model as described was implemented using NetLogo
(Wilensky 1999). A screen shot is given in ﬁgure 3. To see if
the model gives reasonable outcomes, tests are performed us-
ing simple urban structures where workers are randomly gen-
erated and employment is concentrated at a ﬁnite set of loca-
tions. e simplest scenario is the mono-centric urban model
An Agent-Based Model of Origin Destination Estimation (ABODE) 
where all employment is at one location. However, since nei-
ther workers’ residences or workplaces are allowed to change,
thismodel would have everyoneworking at the core and travel
times would be determined by where housing is located rela-
tive to the center. Hence we start with a slightly more compli-
cated landscape where there are four employment zones, each
located at the center of a quadrant that divides the modeled
area into four zones.
To simplify themodel, the total number of employmentop-
portunities available at each employment zone aremade equal.
A total of 520 workers are also randomly generated and dis-
tributed through out the plane, but with each quadrant hav-
ing equal number of residents (see ﬁgures 2a to 2d). Several
versions of this layout are tested while changing diﬀerent vari-
ables in the model but without altering the landscape (the lo-
cation of employment and workers’ residences). In the sim-
plest cases tested, it is also assumed that there is no skill dif-
ferentiation, and no wage dispersion at the given skill level.
Each of these are relaxed and the commute outcomes of the
model are compared. In addition, diﬀerent combinations of
minimum and maximum search eﬀort, and the possibility of
contacts enabling matching are also modeled.
Four test cases that illustrate how themodel matches work-
ers and jobs are discussed next. Under each of these cases one
or two variables are changed to illustrate how the ODmatch-
ing is aﬀected. In case 1, all jobs and workers have no skill
diﬀerentiation and all wages are the same. In case 2, wages are
assumed to have a uniform distribution but no skill diﬀerenti-
ation exists. In case 3, skill diﬀerentiation exists, wages are also
an increasing function of skills, however there is no wage dis-
persion at any skill level. In case 4, skill diﬀerentiation exists
and for 25 percent of workers searching for work, contacts can
improve their chances of hire if they are under-qualiﬁed for a
position. ree skill levels are assumed but there is no wage
dispersion at at any skill level. In each of these cases the search
intensity for each agentwhen searching is a randomdraw from
a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 5. Eachmodel is run
until no employment changes occur for any agent for 50 con-
secutive iterations. Table 1 summarizes the main attributes of
these cases.
Figures 2a to 2d show the matched home and work out-
comes fromone typical run under the described case. For clar-
ity only the home-work connections for the jobs located in
one quadrant are shown. e large black dots are the employ-
ment centers, and the small red dots are the workers (located
at their residences).
e ﬁrst case, as expected, leads to the shortest home to
work distances. Most of the workers in the quadrant also live
in the same quadrant. e outcome is similar in each of the
other quadrants. e average home to work distance in this
case is 16.3 units. In case 2, all attributes of the model 1 are
kept the same, with only wage diﬀerentiation allowed. In this
case the wage oﬀered by any one position is a random draw
from a uniform distribution between $10K-$20K. In this case
the average distance travelled rises signiﬁcantly to 23.3 units.
In case 3, each of the jobs as well as workers is randomly as-
signed one of three job classes. Here again, matching the dif-
ferentiated skills leads to higher home towork distances. Case
4, also leads to higher distances as positions relax their require-
ments and allow under-skilled but socially connected individ-
uals, but much of the rise is accounted for by skill diﬀerentia-
tion. Indeed there is no a-priori reason for jobs found through
contacts to lead to shorter commutes unless the process oc-
curs through neighbors who themselves have short commutes.
Based on 100 simulations each, in moving from the simplest
model (case 1) to a model with wage dispersion (case 2), the
sum of commute distances rises by about 76 percent as those
with attractive wages become less likely to take on lower pay-
ing but closer jobs. is value reduces to 48percentwhenboth
wage dispersion and skill diﬀerentiation are both present. e
model with skill diﬀerentiation but no wage dispersion at a
given skill level (case 3) leads to a rise of about 5.5 percent.
Table 1:Model parameters for illustrative cases
case t o l Imin Imax Job classes Pc * Pc l Wd i s p
1 0 0 5 1 0 0
2 0 0 5 1 0 1
3 0 0 5 3 0 0
4 1 0 5 3 0.25 0
5 Model Stability
To test the model’s sensitivity, the commute outcomes to dif-
ferent combinations of the input variables is tested. Two gen-
eral cases are studied. In case 1, wages are taken as exoge-
nous to the search process and adjustments do not occur as de-
scribed in section 3.8. In this case o , c , and r are all set to 0,
which means only the expected wage when employed rises to
the wage currently being paid. In the second case, each of the
rise proportions (o ,c ,r ) are assumed to be random draws
from a uniform distribution between 0 and 0.05. e input
variables in each case are the existence of wage dispersion, skill
diﬀerentiation, the use of inﬂuential contacts, and the skill
       .
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(a) Simplest model, no skill or wage diﬀerentiation
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(b)Wage diﬀerentiation, no skill diﬀerentiation
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(c) Skill diﬀerentiation, nowage diﬀerentiation at a given
skill level
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(d)Contact inﬂuence and skill diﬀerentiation
Figure 2: Toy model commute outputs under diﬀerent assumptions
An Agent-Based Model of Origin Destination Estimation (ABODE) 
mismatch tolerance in considering applicants. In each of these
tests the minimum and maximum search intensities are set to
be random draws from a uniform distribution between 0 and
5. Each of these factor combinations are set to two levels for
a 25 factorial design. e 32 diﬀerent combinations are run
25 times each, for a total of 800 simulations over which the
commute outcome was evaluated. In each of these runs, the
employment locations are ﬁxed. Residential locations on the
other hand are freely chosen within each quadrant while each
quadrant still has equal number of workers. Residents are al-
lowed to locate freely since we are mainly concerned with the
overall pattern of commute in these tests.
e results from these tests illustrate the model is stable
within replications, and responds in a consistent manner to
adjustments of the variables in the model. Table 2 presents
an analysis of variance on the mean home to work distance
under the tested combinations. Changes in the variables of
the model account for the majority of the behavior that is ob-
served in successive runs of the model. About 80.4 percent
of the variance in the average commute outcome is accounted
for by the levels of the factors. Wage dispersion accounts for a
signiﬁcant amount of the variance. In transitioning from the
simplest model (Case 1) to one where there is wage disper-
sion, the average home to work distance rises by 5.5 units as
searchers compete for the best ﬁtting job available.
6 Testing the Model with Minnesota Data
e model was applied to a subset of the 2000 TBI (Travel
Behavior Inventory) data for the Twin Cities region. is
data set was chosen because it includes disaggregated indi-
vidual data for workers and the location of their of employ-
ment. Consideration was also given to using the Longitudinal
Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) data set. However,
while the LEHD includes blockgroup level data for both in-
come and sector of employment, there is no linkbetween these
two variables at both the residential and workplace ends. It is
therefore not possible to know which sectors are paying what
amount to workers in a blockgroup. e downside to using
the TBI is that the data does not contain employment sector
information or more details that could be used on the work-
place. Nonetheless, the disaggregate detail allows the individ-
ual level identiﬁcation of each worker and their demographic
and education characterstics. In addition, the necessary edu-
cation level and salary levels for the employment locations can
also be approximated by the characteristics of the person cur-
rently occupying these positions.
Since income is reported at the household level in the TBI,
for this test application we use only single worker house-
holds that reported one job and lived and worked in the
metropolitan area. While it is possible that respondents re-
ported income includes non-wage earnings, this approach at
least avoids additional assumption about how income should
be subdivided among workers in multi-worker households or
between jobs when a second employment is reported. A total
of 805 individuals were extracted from the data who, in ad-
dition to the above criteria, had also reported their education
level. e education level was used to classify the skill level
of the respondent as well as the job-class of the respondent’s
place of employment into one of ﬁve categories. Once these
data are extracted from the TBI, the link between home and
work are severed, and the challenge is to re-establish the link
using the agent-based model.
Before running the simulation, certain modiﬁcations had
to be made to the model to make it work with the TBI. First
the deﬁnition of job classes as well as skill classes had to be ad-
justed. Since the data includes the education level of respon-
dents and where they work, each job is marked as requiring
the skill class of the person who currently occupies it. e
workers skill class is also marked by their education level. e
ﬁve categories used for skill classiﬁcation correspond to “Be-
low High school,” “High school graduate,” “2 years of col-
lege/Associate’s Degree,” “4 years of college/Bachelor’s De-
gree” and “Post-graduate.” e initial expected wage of each
worker is set at 70 percent of their reported income. In ad-
dition, the minimum pay below which agents will not work
is set to 70 percent of their initial expected wage. e oﬀer
pay at the start of the simulation for the positions is set at the
70 percent of the income that the respondent currently work-
ing there reported. Each position is allowed to oﬀer up to 75
percent above what its occupant reports as income in making
itself competitive. e function f (.) in equation 9 is set to 1
so that wage change percentages are a random draw from the
uniform distributions deﬁned by o,max , c ,max , and r,max .
In addition to these modiﬁcations, parameters of the simula-
tion were set to reﬂect the limitations imposed by the data.
e matching tolerance (t o l , equation 2) as well as the pro-
portion of contacts that are inﬂuential (Pc l ) are both set to
zero.
Other aspects of the basic model remain the same. Diﬀer-
ent combinations of Imin , Imax , o,max , c ,max , and r,max
were used to run the simulation to replicate the distribution
of distances as observed in the TBI data. For the Twin Cities
case, the model is run until all working individuals from the
simulation have been at their last jobs at least 100 iterations
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Table 2: Analysis of variance for test model
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Wage rise 1 1228.92 1228.92 675.94 0.000
Wage rise:Match tolerance 2 391.12 195.56 107.56 0.000
Wage rise:Skill diﬀerentiation 2 39.55 19.78 10.88 0.000
Wage rise:Contact use 2 57.20 28.60 15.73 0.000
Wage rise:Wage dispersion 2 4181.93 2090.97 1150.09 0.000
Residuals 790 1436.29 1.82
(which is to say no one has changed their job in the last 100
iterations) or unemployment levels are at 4 percent or less and
the model has run for 1500 iteration. In general the ﬁrst con-
dition tended to dominate and achieved employment for 93-
95 percent of the searching agents.
e tested combinations of the model parameters and the
values that replicated the commute distribution for the work-
ers adequately are shown in table 3. A combination of longer
runtimes with moderate wage raises annually for employed
persons (r,max = 0.02), latitude for aggressive recruitment
by increasing wages for positions that are not taken (o,max =
0.1), and yearly declines in expectedwages for theunemployed
(c ,max = 0.05), leads to on aggregate reasonable distance and
wage distribution. Figures 4a and 4b show the counts of in-
dividuals in diﬀerent commute and wage categories from 200
simulations using the best ﬁt parameters. Boundaries around
the mean simulated count for each distance and income cate-
gory reﬂect the range of 95 percent of the counts from these
simulations. Visual examination indicates that the overall dis-
tance distribution provides a good ﬁt for the observed data.
While the wage distribution doesn’t replicate the observed
wages as well as the distances distribution especially in the
lower income ranges, the simulated results are more accept-
able for income ranges of above $30,000.
e job matching mechanism in the model leads to aggre-
gate distributions that are in tunewith observed distributions.
However, individual levelmatching ismuch less precise. ese
challenges can be seen in ﬁgures 5a and 5b. Each plot shows
the distribution of home to work distances and salaries from
the simulation for those individuals whose actual distance and
salary falls in the categories on the horizontal axis. ough
the increasing trend points in the right direction, both plots
suggest that there is considerable variance in the predictions
for those in each category. ere are several potential rea-
sons why these mismatches appear. Primarily this is because
the mechanism for matching skills and wages currently uses
only education levels. Because this leads to jobs being identi-
ﬁed as requiring a ’high school diploma’, ’a bachelor’s degree’
and so on, employment opportunities that are not similar in
the type of skill they require are assumed to be equivalent in
the model. Since the link between education and income is
not very strong in the data, a person who has a high school
diplomamay be oﬀered the job currently being done by some-
one who has a similar education background but whose skill
sets are much broader and command higher wages. Improved
matching would be possible if information on sector, job type,
and experience were available. ese would make it easier for
the employer agents to better ﬁlter qualiﬁed applicants.
Overall, despite challenges at the individual level, the
model replicates the aggregate distributions quite well. It
should be noted that the model is using data that is not very
well suited for its needs. e use of education as a proxy for
skills particularly is too general and allows persons to con-
sider and take positions for which they are not qualiﬁed. As
currently implemented, the model also assumes that people’s
commute decisions are permanent. In reality people can ac-
cept longer commutes with the hope of reducing their com-
mute through a residential move. For others a shorter com-
mute may allow them to choose housing at farther distances.
Future direction for addressing such challenges and identify-
ing data needs are discussed in the next section.
Table 3:Model parameters
Variable Values Best ﬁt
Imin 0, 3, 5 5
Imax 5, 10, 15 10
c ,max 0.02, 0.05 0.05
r,max 0.02, 0.05 0.02
o,max 0.02, 0.05, 0.1 0.1
t o l 0 0
t¯r 4 4
Pc l *Pc 0 0
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Figure 4:Mean simulated aggregate distance and wage distributions as compared to actual data
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Figure 5: Box plots of simulated distance and wage distributions for persons whose actual distance and incomes are shown on the
horizontal axes. Plot is based on one random run of the model
7 Summary
is paper develops an agent-based job matching model. e
model explicitly considers the job-search process and simu-
lates a commute distance and wage distribution for work-
ers. Using a toy urban area we show that the model leads to
reasonable outcomes, with agents selecting the closest work
place when wage and skill diﬀerentiation is absent. Relaxing
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these assumptions increases the observed commute. e in-
troduction of wage dispersion at given skill levels in themodel
specially increases the average home to work distance signif-
icantly. e model is also tested using data from the Min-
neapolis - St. Paul Metropolitan area. e commute results
from this simulation on aggregate capture the trends in the
observed data and illustrate that the behavior rules as imple-
mented lead to reasonable patterns. e wage distributions of
the simulation also provided a reasonable match though to a
lesser extent. But weaknesses were present in replicating in-
dividual level distances and wages. In part these weaknesses
are the result using data collected to be used in a traditional
gravitymodel that did not include (nor require) details on the
job seeker and employment opportunities that are key to the
current model.
As the demand for more disaggregate models increases, we
believe the agent based approach holds several beneﬁts that
make it attractive. Primary among these is that it is eas-
ily extendable. One could easily move from modeling rela-
tively long-term decisions at the individual or household level
to using them as constraints to other short-term decisions.
Individual-level and household-level tastes could be incorpo-
rated in a straightforward manner giving the agents quali-
ties that are diﬃcult to achieve in aggregate models. Once
calibrated for jobs, the model could be used to model other
shorter term location decisions such as where to shop or meet
friends. e approach also provides an environment in which
the environment and the agent are simultaneously aﬀected by
one another.
At least two lines of further work are essential. e ﬁrst is
to improve the matching by incorporating more detailed in-
formation on both searchers and jobs so that matching can
further be reﬁned. In the current data, for example, the con-
nection between reported education levels and wages tended
to be weak. erefore, better ways of gauging the skill require-
ments of positions are needed. e data needed to more fully
test the proposedmodel would need to include at a minimum
data on skills and experience that go beyond education levels
and ask speciﬁc streams of study or areas of expertise. In ad-
dition, wage data for diﬀerent skills are also required. On the
employer side, details on jobs would need to be more speciﬁc
than the educational level of those currently occupying the po-
sition. e type of job, the industrial class of the ﬁrm, as well
as the wages that are paid would help improve the match that
is created.
A second line is to incorporate the eﬀect of residential loca-
tion (and relocation) in aﬀecting what a person accepts as an
acceptable commute. In addition, the tradeoﬀs multi-worker
households make between each other’s commute should be
considered. e current model considers only individuals and
assumes that they do not relocate to adjust their commute.
However, some of the home-work commute observed in the
test data is likely to have been measured aer a residential re-
location.
ese extensions can strengthen themodel andmake it use-
ful not only for OD matching, but also for testing diﬀerent
policy prescriptions thatmay impact both job search and com-
mute outcomes. By working at the individual level, the ap-
proach also makes possible other extensions which look at the
persons non-work activities while carrying over their personal
attributes and constraints.
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